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FINANCIAL INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES-
BACKGROUND, CURRENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS*
Alfred Broaddus
The purpose of this paper is to describe recent
financial innovation in the United States, outline its
principal implications with regard to (1) the structure
and behavior of financial markets and (2) the conduct
of monetary policy, and speculate on the likely char-
acter of further innovation in the near-term future.
In the United States as elsewhere, financial innova-
tion has been a continuous but uneven process, where
the rate of innovation has varied substantially from
one period to the next depending on a variety of
circumstances. In particular, there have been a
number of periods of accelerated innovation in U. S.
financial history, frequently during or following
periods of great social and political upheaval such as
the Civil War and the Great Depression. It seems
clear in retrospect that the 1970s and early 1980s
have been years of relatively rapid innovation due
largely to (1) higher inflation and its impact on
interest rates and (2) rapid technological progress
that has significantly reduced the real costs of carry-
ing out financial transactions. This accelerated inno-
vation has already had a profound effect on the
competitive structure and risk characteristics of
American banking and financial markets, on the way
these markets are regulated, and on the conduct of
U. S. monetary policy. Further, while there is some
reason to believe that the pace of innovation may
diminish in the United States in the years immedi-
ately ahead, the full impact of the innovations that
have already occurred probably has not yet been felt.
The paper is organized as fol1ows.
l Section I pro-
vides background information on the structure and
regulation of American financial markets, with
*This paper was delivered at the First International
Symposium on Financial Development sponsored by the
Korea Federation of Banks in Seoul on December 4, 1984.
The views expressed in the paper are the author’s and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, the Federal Reserve System, or the
Korea Federation of Banks.
1 The paper is organized roughly along the lines of the
2 Table I includes only debt instruments and therefore
framework suggested by M. A. Akhtar. See Akhtar, excludes equity funds. The net issuance of corporate
“Financial Innovation and Monetary Policy: A Frame- stock in 1983 was $46.2 billion. Total corporate stock
work for Analysis,” in Bank for International Settlements outstanding at the end of 1983 was $2,151.4 billion. See
(1984), pp. 3-25. Kaufman, McKeon and Blitz (1984), Table 3C, p. 33.
special attention to the regulation of banks and other
depository institutions. Section II describes the
forces that appear to underlie the accelerated rate of
financial innovation in recent years. Sections III and
IV discuss the impact of this innovation on financial
markets and the conduct of monetary policy, respec-
tively. Finally, Section V speculates briefly on
future prospects. In view of the breadth of the topic
and the purpose of the symposium for which this
paper was prepared, the paper will seek to synthesize
available information on recent financial innovation
in the United States rather than to break new ana-
lytical ground.
I.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE
AND REGULATION OF U. S. FINANCIAL MARKETS
This section provides background information on
the general structure of U. S. financial markets and
the regulation of these markets. This perspective is
essential to an understanding of the nature of recent
financial innovation and the forces underlying it.
A. Structure of U. S. Financial Markets
As is well known, the money and capital markets
in the United States are among the largest and most
highly developed in the world. Tables I and II
provide a general idea of the size, scope and structure
of these markets. Table I is a flow of funds table
that shows total net new demands for and supplies
of funds in U. S. credit markets in recent years in
both dollar and percentage terms. In addition, the
final column on the right side of the table shows total
amounts outstanding at the end of 1983.
2 A S the
table indicates, total new credit flows in 1983
amounted to $515.5 billion. On the demand side,
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DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF CREDIT IN U. S. CREDIT MARKETS
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
e
A. NET DEMAND
1. Annual Net lncreases in Amounts Outstanding ($ billions)
Privately Held Mortgages $117.7  $113.1  $84.2  $73.7  $12.4  $67.0
Corporate and Foreign Bonds 34.4 31.9 39.0 33.9 38.8 35.3
Total Long-Term Private 152.1 144.9 123.2 107.6 -102.3 51.1
Short-Term Business Borrowing 92.2 98.0 67.6 118.6 55.5 44.9
Short-Term Household Borrowing 52.4 49.3 9.8 35.1 23.9 49.9
Total Short-Term Private 144.6 147.3 77.4 153.7 79.4 94.8
Privately Held Federal Debt 86.5 78.6 119.5 128.9 210.9 265.9
Tax-Exempt Notes and Bonds 32.5 27.8 31.9 29.2 63.6 52.6














TOTAL $415.7 $398.7 $351.9 $419.4 $405.0 $515.5 $5,344.8
2. Percentages
1
Privately Held Mortgages 28.3 28.4 23.9 17.6 3.1 13.0 24.7
Corporate and Foreign Bonds 8.3 8.0 11.1 8.1 9.6 6.8 11.6
Total Long-Term Private 36.6      36.4 35.0 25.7 12.6 19.8 36.2
Short-Term Business Borrowing 22.2 24.6 19.2 38.3 13.7 8.7 16.0
Short-Term Household Borrowing 12.6 12.4 2.8 8.4 5.9 9.7 10.8
34.8     36.9 Total Short-Term Private 22.0 36.6 19.6  18.4 26.7
Privately Held Federal Debt 20.8 19.7 34.0 30.7 52.1 51.6 28.1
Tax-Exempt Notes and Bonds 7.8 7.0 9.1 7.0 15.7 10.2 a.9
Total Government 28.6 Debt 26.7 43.0 37.7 67.8 61.8 37.0
TOTAL
B. NET SUPPLY
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1. Annual Net Increases in Amounts Outstanding ($ billions)
Total Nonbank Finance $174.5 $175.7 $152.0 $199.9 $178.5 $267.3
Thrift Institutions 72.8 56.7 54.9 27.2 30.6 126.2
Insurance, Pensions, and
Endowments 72.4 62.0 68.2 72.4 91.0 109.1
Investment Companies 6.6 29.3 15.9 72.4 52.3 8.0
Other Nonbank Finance 22.7 27.8 12.9 28.0 4.6 24.1
Commercial Banks 126.1 122.2 101.8 108.9 108.5 146.3
Nonfinancial Corporations -0.9 7.5 -3.8 5.4 15.5 13.6
State and Local Governments 16.0 7.1 1.8 0.5 6.4 15.2
Foreign Investors 38.0 -4.6 23.2 16.0 17.6 12.8






















State and Local Governments
Foreign Investors
Residual: Households Direct
42.0 44.1 43.2 47.7 44.1 51.9
17.5 14.2 15.6 6.5 7.6 24.5
17.4 15.6 19.4 17.3 22.5 21.2
1.6 7.3 4.5 17.3 12.9 1.6
5.5 7.0 3.7 6.7 1.1 4.7
30.3 30.6 28.9 26.0 26.8 28.4
-0.2 1.9 -1.1 1.3 3.8 2.6
3.8 1.8 0.5 0.1 1.6 2.9
9.1 -1.2 6.6 3.8 4.3 2.5











TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
e Estimated.
1 Details may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source: Kaufman, Henry, James McKeon and Steven Blitz, 1984 Prospects for Financial Markets, New York: Salomon Brothers, Inc.,
December 1983, p. 28.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMONDnew government debt accounted for approximately
62 percent of the total, and new private debt made up
the remainder. As section A2 of the table makes
clear, the principal development affecting the struc-
ture of the demand for credit in the years shown has
been the disproportionate growth of government debt
and especially the growth of federal debt. The net in-
crease in privately held federal debt rose from a little
over 20 percent of total net demand in 1978 to almost
52 percent in 1983. Although part of this increase
reflected normal cyclical developments,
3 the substan-
tial increase in federal expenditures over the last two
decades has produced a strong secular increase in the
growth of federal demands for credit. Section B2 of
the table shows the breakdown of the supply of funds
across various categories of lenders. In 1983, com-
mercial banks provided slightly less than 30 percent
of new funds. All depository institutions (commer-
cial banks plus thrift institutions) provided somewhat
more than half of all funds.
Table II looks more specifically at the relative size
of various classes of financial institutions using data
on the stocks of financial assets held in 1983. As the
data indicate, depository institutions as a group ac-
counted for over half of the total; commercial banks
held approximately a third.
Tables I and II focus on the structure of U. S.
financial markets in terms of dollar flows and stocks.
To appreciate fully the nature of the American finan-
cial system, however, one must take account of the in-
stitutional and geographic character of these markets.
In general, financial markets are less centralized in
the United States than in most other industrial coun-
tries. While New York City is clearly the financial
center of the country, there are important regional
market centers, including regional stock exchanges,
in several other major cities. Nowhere is the relative
decentralization of U. S. markets more apparent,
however, than in the case of commercial banks.
4 As
of the end of 1983 there were 14,454 insured com-
mercial banks in the United States of which 4,751
were national banks chartered by the federal govern-
ment and the remainder were state banks chartered
by the various state governments. Although several
major international banking organizations are based
in the United States, overall banking resources are
3 1978 was the fourth year of the business expansion that
followed the recession that ended in the first quarter of
1975. 1983 was the first year of the recovery from the
recession that ended in the fourth quarter of 1982.
4 The historical and regulatory factors that have influ-
enced the structure of the U. S. banking industry are
discussed below.
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
considerably less concentrated than in most other
countries. In December 1982, the 10 largest banking
organizations based in the United States held only
about 18 percent of total domestic deposits.
B. The Regulation of U. S. Markets
A thorough review of the regulation of the U. S.
financial system is beyond the scope of this paper.
5
The extent and intensity of regulation vary greatly
across markets, from the minimal regulation of the
market for U. S. government securities to the com-
prehensive regulation of commercial banks. It is
the regulatory system applied to banks and other
depository institutions that is most relevant to recent
financial innovation in the United States. Therefore,
the remainder of this section focuses primarily on
banking regulation.
1. Evolution of banking regulation in the United
States Banking has been systematically regulated in
the United States throughout the nation’s history.
The character of this regulatory apparatus has
changed significantly from one period to the next,
5 For a comprehensive recent survey see George J. Ben-
ston, “The Regulation of Financial Services,” in Benston
(1983B), pp. 28-63.
4 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1985and it has been a major source of political controversy
since the earliest days of the republic. Indeed, one of
the principal political debates in the years immedi-
ately following the Revolution centered around the
question of whether the federal government or the
respective state governments should predominate in
the regulation of banks.
This issue has never been fully resolved. The
period from the Revolution until 1836 was one of
constant tension. The majority of banks were char-
tered and supervised by the states. The federal
government chartered only two banks in this period,
the First Bank of the United States (1791-1811) and
the Second Bank of the United States (1816-1836).
These two banks, however, had branches nationwide,
exercised some central banking functions, and, as a
result, became principal targets for those who sought
to restrict the growth of the power of the federal
government.
When President Andrew Jackson vetoed the legis-
lation that would have renewed the charter of the
Second Bank, the states temporarily gained ascen-
dancy in banking regulation. Further, between 1837
and 1860 a number of states adopted so-called “free
banking” laws under which banks could be freely
established as long as certain minimum, well-defined
conditions regarding capital and collateralization of
notes were met. This period has usually been re-
garded as an unsuccessful experiment with “laissez-
faire” banking during which the absence of regulation
led to abuses (by so-called “wildcat” banks) that
demonstrated the need for greater regulation.
6 The
extent of regulation began to increase gradually in the
1860s, and the federal government slowly but surely
reestablished its participation with the passage of the
National Banking Act in 1863 and the Federal Re-
serve Act in 1913.
7
2. Foundation of the present regulatory system
Although the history of banking regulation prior to
the early 1930s has an important bearing on the
present regulatory system, especially with regard to
geographic restrictions on branching, the major force
that shaped the current system was the reaction to
6 This view of the Free Banking Era has been challenged
in an important recent article by Rolnick and Weber
(1983).
7 For more detailed discussions of banking regulation in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see Thomas
C. Huertas, “The Regulation of Financial Institutions: A
Historical Perspective on Current Issues,” in Benston
(1983B). See also McCarthy (1984). The standard works
on the period are Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and
Hammond (1957).
the traumatic banking crisis that accompanied the
Great Depression. Some monetary historians now
attribute the crisis to the failure of the Federal Re-
serve System to provide adequate reserves to the
banking system in the face of an international finan-
cial panic and a major worldwide economic contrac-
tion.
8 At the time, however, the upheaval was blamed
mainly on (1) excessive competition in the provision
of banking services and (2) speculative activity and
conflicts of interest that resulted from the active
participation of commercial banks in investment
banking activities in the 1920s. The comprehensive
banking legislation of the early 1930s, which is the
foundation of the present regulatory system, was
designed to correct these perceived weaknesses.
The main elements of this legislation were as
follows :
(a) Separation of commercial and investment
banking. The Banking Act of 1933, known popularly
as the Glass-Steagall Act, prohibited commercial
banks from engaging in most underwriting and other
investment banking activities. The idea was that
commercial banks would invest primarily in short-
term, “self-liquidating” commercial loans and other
liquid assets in accordance with the real-bills doctrine
that was influential at the time. This effort to keep
commercial banking separate from the securities
industry and other commercial activities has been
extended by more recent legislation, particularly the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and the 1970
amendments to that Act.
(b) Restrictions on the payment of interest on
deposits. Banks were prohibited from paying interest
on demand deposits, and the Federal Reserve was
given the authority to set ceiling rates on time de-
posits. The Fed has regulated time deposit rates over
the years through its Regulation Q.
(c) Deposit insurance and restrictions on entry.
The Banking Act of 1933 established the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation to administer a na-
tional deposit insurance system. It set specific and
generally restrictive conditions for the granting of
national charters and indirectly set standards for state
charters through the conditions imposed for admis-
sion to the insurance system.
(d) Maintenance of geographic restrictions on
branching. The banking legislation of the 1930s left
the restrictions on branching contained in the Mc-
8 See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), chapter 7.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 5Fadden Act of 1927 unchanged. Under these re-
strictions, interstate branching was prohibited, and
nationally chartered banks had to conform to any
further restrictions imposed by state law in the states
in which they operated.
The general thrust of this regulatory system is
clear. Commercial banking was to be insulated from
other financial and commercial activities. In order
to promote stability, entry into the industry, entry
into particular geographic markets, and price compe-
tition were to be severely limited. In the Hegelian
dialectic, thesis generates forces producing antithesis,
and the tension is eventually resolved through syn-
thesis. In U. S. financial markets, the regulatory
system established in the 1930s is the thesis, and the
extensive financial innovation of recent years is the
antithesis. The synthesis of these opposing forces is
presently being formed.
II.
FORCES UNDERLYING RECENT FINANCIAL
INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES
As suggested at the end of the preceding section,
recent financial innovation in the United States is
largely a reaction to the restrictive and essentially
anti-competitive regulatory system established in the
1930s. The forces motivating this innovation have
existed since the system came into being, but they
have been greatly strengthened over the last 25 years
by two essentially external developments: (1) ac-
celerated technological progress in the computer and
communications industries and (2) a secular increase
in the rate of inflation accompanied by high and
volatile interest rates. This section briefly describes
these developments.
A. Technological Advances
Technological progress in the computer and com-
munications fields in recent years has led to a truly
phenomenal reduction in the real cost of processing
and transmitting data. It has been estimated that
between the mid-1960s and 1980 computer processing
costs declined at an average annual rate of 25 percent,
and communications costs fell at a rate of 11 percent.
9
The impact of these developments has been especially
great in banking and financial markets. In particular,
the quantum reduction in real transactions costs has
made it both feasible and profitable for banks to offer,
9 See Kaufman, Mote and Rosenblum (1983), p. 9.
and for business firms and households to use, so-
phisticated cash management techniques to reduce the
proportion of liquid assets held in deposits or other
instruments subject to interest rate ceilings. This
same technology has made it feasible for nonbank
financial institutions such as securities firms to offer
financial products that combine their traditional in-
vestment services with transactions services that
closely resemble those formerly provided exclusively
by commercial banks. The Cash Management Ac-
count offered by Merrill Lynch, for example, which
combines a conventional securities account with a
credit line and a money market fund that has a third-
party payments capability would not have been feas-
ible in the absence of the ability to process, record
and store large volumes of data relatively inexpen-
sively. The same is true of a myriad of other cash
management services now offered by both banks and
other financial institutions and of the infrastructure
that supports them such as electronic funds transfer
systems and automated clearinghouses.
B. Inflation and Interest Rates
The technological developments described above
would have had a substantial impact on cash manage-
ment practices in any event, but the incentive to
develop these techniques has been greatly increased
by the behavior of inflation and interest rates in the
United States since roughly 1965. As indicated by
Chart 1, the inflation rate was below 3 percent during
most of the period between the Korean War and the
1950 1960 1970 1980
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
6 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1985mid-1960s. After 1964, the expansive fiscal and
monetary policies associated with enlarged domestic
social programs and the financing of the war in Viet-
nam and subsequently the petroleum shocks of the
1970s produced a steady if irregular increase in infla-
tion to a peak rate exceeding 13 percent in 1980.
While not particularly high by world standards, this
was the highest peacetime inflation in modern Ameri-
can history.
The rise in inflation was accompanied by corre-
sponding increases in the level and volatility of inter-
est rates, which can be seen in Chart 2. Through
most of the 1950s and early 1960s, the opportunity
cost of holding non-interest-bearing demand deposits
and savings or other time deposits subject to Regu-
lation Q ceilings was either relatively low or non-
existent. The so-called credit crunch of 1966, how-
ever, was the first of a series of tight credit episodes
during which market rates rose significantly above
the Regulation Q ceilings. Initially, these episodes
occasioned massive but generally temporary transfers
of funds from accounts subject to the ceilings to
market instruments such as Treasury bills. This
“disintermediation” of funds was both costly and
disruptive. In particular, because the majority of
mortgage credit in the 1960s and early 1970s was
provided by savings and loan associations and other
thrift institutions that derived most of their funds
from time deposits subject to the ceilings, disinter-
mediation led to severe periodic restrictions of the
availability of credit to support residential construc-
tion. The housing and building trades lobbies are
powerful political forces in the United States, and
the disruption of these industries by disintermediation
was an important factor leading to the reevaluation of
banking regulation discussed below.
As Chart 2 shows, market interest rates have ex-
ceeded the Regulation Q passbook ceiling both sub-
stantially and continuously since the end of 1976.
10
As a result, the temporary disintermediation that
characterized the period between 1965 and 1977 has
been supplanted by the more comprehensive and
permanent innovations described in the next section.
Aside from the higher level of interest rates and
the incentives it has created, Chart 2 shows that the
variability of rate movements has also increased
sharply over the last decade.
11 This greater vari-
ability has increased uncertainty and risk in financial
markets-particularly in markets for long-term se-
curities. This increased interest rate risk has created
strong incentives for financial institutions to devise
new financial instruments and develop new markets
that make it possible for institutional and other in-
vestors to reduce their exposure to risk.
III.
INNOVATION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
The combination of forces and incentives described
in Section II of this paper has produced a series of
financial innovations in the United States that have
become increasingly visible to the general public
since the late 1950s. Rather than attempting an
exhaustive inventory,
12this section will focus on the
major innovations. Special attention will be given
to innovations in banking and depository markets,
since these particular innovations have important
implications for the conduct of monetary policy as
well as the provision of financial services.
13 In addi-
tion to discussing the innovations themselves, the
important movement toward the deregulation of
10 Ceiling rates on other time deposits subject to ceilings
were scaled upward from the passbook ceiling.
11 This heightened variability may have been due in part
to changes in late 1979 in the operating procedures used
by the Federal Reserve to implement monetary policy.
These changes shifted the short-run operational emphasis
from the Federal funds rate to various reserve aggregates.
See Axilrod (1982).
12 A comprehensive listing as of the end of 1982 can be
found in Silber (1983), p. 91.
13 The monetary policy implications are discussed in
Section IV below.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 7interest rates that is currently in progress will be
summarized to date,
14 and the impact of these de-
velopments on the quantitative structure of depository
markets will be detailed.
A. Innovation in Banking Markets
Innovation in banking and other depository mar-
kets has been proceeding at a rapid pace for at least a
quarter of a century.
15 The initial developments
primarily affected commercial banks and their cor-
porate customers. By the end of the 1970s, however,
it involved all depository institutions and a number
of nondepository and even nonfinancial firms, and
household as well as business customers.
1. The 1960s and Early 1970s: The “Cat and
Mouse” Game between Banks and Regulators and
Initial Steps toward Deregulation By the late 1950s
it had become apparent to most money center banks
in the United States that many major corporate cus-
tomers had sharpened their cash management prac-
tices and found ways to lower their average holdings
of non-interest-bearing deposits. Since these deposits
were a major source of funds for these banks, it was
essential that the banks react to this development,
which they did with the introduction of large negotia-
ble CDs in 1961. These CDs bore interest, although
they were initially subject to the Regulation Q ceil-
ing. The important thing about the negotiable CD
was precisely that it was negotiable. Hence, when it
neared maturity, it was essentially a marketable,
interest-bearing liquid asset, in contrast to ordinary
time deposits, which could not be transferred and
could not bear interest at maturities under 30 days.
The negotiable CD was a huge success in the early
1960s, and it allowed the money center banks to
regain at least temporarily much of the ground they
had lost. Beyond that, the negotiable CD introduced
the concept of “liability management,” which dra-
matically altered the character of wholesale banking
in the United States. Prior to that time, banks had
depended primarily on demand deposits as their
major funding source. Since banks were prohibited
from paying explicit interest on these deposits, they
compensated their business customers-and to a
14 Table III lists the principal actions taken to deregulate
interest rates between 1972 and 1983.
15 Several economists have attempted to formulate theo-
retical models to capture the nature of the process de-
scribed in this section. See in particular Ben-Horim and
Silber (1977) and Kane, “Microeconomic and Macro-
economic Origins of Financial Innovation,” in Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (1984), pp. 3-20.
lesser degree their household customers-implicitly
by providing them a variety of free services, espe-
cially payments services. The negotiable CD substi-
tuted explicit interest for implicit interest. By vary-
ing the rate of interest, banks could actively influence
the volume of deposit inflows rather than merely
accepting deposits passively. Further, since negotia-
ble CDs involved no payments services, their intro-
duction moved banks in the direction of pure inter-
mediation.
16 While these changes benefited banks
in a number of ways, they also exposed them to the
risk of unanticipated short-run swings in the cost of
funds due to market forces beyond their control.
The volume of negotiable CDs grew steadily up to
16 See Heurtes, “The Regulation of Financial Institu-











MAJOR ACTIONS TO DEREGULATE
INTEREST RATES ON DEPOSITS
1972-1983
Action
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts intro-
duced in Massachusetts.
‘Wild card” experiment. Initial use of ceiling-free,
small denomination time deposits. Deposits had mini-
mum maturity of 4 years. Experiment lasted 4 months.
Introduction of 6-month money market certificates with
yields tied to 6-month Treasury bill rate.
Introduction of small saver certificates, with yields tied
to U. S. Treasury securities with comparable maturities.
Minimum maturity initially 4 years, but subsequently
reduced.
Passage of Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act.
1. Set 6-year phase out of interest rate ceilings on
time deposits.
2. Authorized NOW accounts nationwide, effective at
the end of 1980.
Introduction of nationwide NOW accounts.
Introduction of ceiling-free Individual Retirement Ac-
counts (IRAs).
Introduction of several new accounts paying market
rates.
1. 91-day money market certificate.
2. 3½year ceiling-free time deposit.
3. 7-31 day time deposit.
Passage of Garn-St. Germain Act, which authorized
money market deposit accounts.
Nearly complete deregulation of interest rates on time
deposits.
1. Elimination of ceilings on all time deposits with
original maturities exceeding 32 days.
2. Elimination of all ceilings on time deposits with
original maturities from 7 to 31 days with minimum
balance of $2,500.
8 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 19851966, but the credit crunch of that year drove market
rates well above the Regulation Q ceiling, and this
condition persisted through most of the remainder of
the decade. As a result, banks again experienced
large outflows of funds and were driven to seek
alternative sources not subject to the ceiling. There
ensued what has been described as a “cat and mouse”
game in which banks would first develop either (1) a
new source, such as borrowing Eurodollars from
offshore affiliates, or (2) new short-term instru-
ments, such as commercial paper issued by holding
company affiliates and various forms of RP con-
tracts. After a brief delay, the Federal Reserve
would then step in, define the instrument as a deposit
and subject it to the Regulation Q ceiling and to
reserve requirements. In short, the 1960s illustrated
the cycle of banking innovation, regulatory reaction
and further innovation in an especially dynamic form.
While this process was fascinating to witness and
highly profitable to the lawyers, accountants and
other specialists employed by it, it was also costly,
both to individual institutions and to society as a
whole in terms of its relatively inefficient use of real
resources to avoid regulatory constraints. By the
early 1970s it had become apparent to financial econ-
omists and many public officials that the bank regu-
latory system that had been built in the 1930s was
not an appropriate structure for the financial environ-
ment of the 1970s. Several events occurred in this
period that were the initial steps in the deregulation
process that reached its full stride in the early 1980s.
First, in the face of continued disintermediation, the
Regulation Q ceiling was lifted in 1970 for CDs over
$100,000. Second, a Presidential Commission on Fi-
nancial Structure and Regulation (the Hunt Com-
mission) issued an important report at the end of
1971 that recommended among other things that all
ceilings on time deposits be phased out over a five-
year period and that both thrift institutions and banks
be granted somewhat broader powers. Banks, in
particular, would be allowed to underwrite some
municipal revenue bonds and sell mutual funds.
17
Finally, so-called NOW (for negotiable order of
withdrawal) accounts were introduced in several
New England states beginning in 1972. These essen-
tially transactions accounts were functionally equiva-
lent to demand deposits but they bore explicit inter-
est. NOW accounts were originally devised by thrift
17 For an interesting retrospective on the influence of the
Hunt Commission’s report written by the Commission’s
co-directors, see Almarin Phillips and Donald P. Jacobs,
“Reflections on the Hunt Commission,” in Benston
(1983B), chapter 9.
institutions as a means of competing more effectively
with commercial banks for retail customers, but their
broader significance was that they were the first fi-
nancial innovation to have a direct (and beneficial)
effect on ordinary retail customers as opposed to
corporations and wealthy individuals.
2. 1975-1983: Accelerated Innovation, Increased
Competition and Deregulation As indicated in Chart
2, the sustained rise in market interest rates well
above Regulation Q ceilings after 1976 greatly in-
creased the incentive for banks to devise means to
circumvent the restriction. The rise in rates also
increased the opportunity cost of the non-interest-
bearing reserves that banks that were members of
the Federal Reserve System were required to hold,
which caused many banks to drop their membership
and created strong incentives to devise instruments
not subject to reserve requirements. Finally, as
suggested above, technological advances coupled with
the relatively high profitability of banking activities
created powerful incentives for nonbank institutions
to enter banking markets and provide bank and
quasi-bank services. These conditions ignited an
explosion of financial innovation and subsequent de-
regulation in depository markets over the eight-year
period between 1975 and 1983.
A key innovation in this period was the money
market mutual fund (MMMF).
18 These funds are
pools of liquid assets managed by investment com-
panies that sell small denomination shares in the
funds to the public. Although the funds are not
covered by deposit insurance, they are backed fully
by high quality liquid assets, are not subject to rate
ceilings or reserve requirements, and in some cases
allow limited third-party transactions. Aggregate
MMMF assets grew rapidly after 1976, from $3.3
billion in 1977 to $76.3 billion in 1980 to $186.9
billion in 1981. (See Chart 3.)
The growth of MMMFs put enormous competi-
tive pressure on U. S. banks. The banks, in turn,
put substantial pressure on the regulatory agencies
and Congress for relief. The first response to this
pressure was the authorization of so-called money
market certificates (MMC) by the regulatory agen-
cies. These certificates had no third-party payment
capability, but they were covered by deposit insur-
ance, and they had a rate ceiling that floated with
the 6-month Treasury bill rate.
The MMCs were generally well received, but they
18 See Cook and Duffield (1979) for an extensive descrip-
tion and analysis of MMMFs.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 9did not significantly reduce the growth of MMMFs.
Intense political pressure for further deregulation
developed and culminated in the passage of the De-
pository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act in March 1980. This watershed legis-
lation was the most comprehensive banking law en-
acted by Congress since the Banking Acts of 1933
and 1935. It had a large number of diverse pro-
visions, but the critical ones were the following:
1. All interest rate ceilings on time deposits were
to be phased out over a six-year period.
2. NOW accounts were authorized for all banks
and thrift institutions nationwide, effective De-
cember 31, 1980. (The accounts can be offered
to individuals but not to corporations.)
3. State usury laws that put ceilings on mortgage
rates were to be eliminated unless a state gov-
ernment specifically passed a law reinstating
the ceiling.
4. The restrictions on the ability of thrift institu-
tions such as savings and loan associations to
invest in assets other than residential mort-
gages were eased somewhat.
5. All depository institutions were given access to
the Federal Reserve discount window and to
other Fed services, but they were also sub-
jected to Federal Reserve reserve requirements.
The importance of this legislation in the context of
the historical perspective developed earlier in this
article should be apparent. In particular, the lifting
of interest rate restrictions in items 1, 2, and 3 above
reversed a fundamental element-and, implicitly, a
fundamental premise-of the 1930s legislation: that
price (i.e., interest rate) competition in banking
markets is unhealthy.
The final steps in the process of deregulation to
date were taken in 1982 and 1983 following passage
of the Garn-St. Germain Act in late 1982. Like the
1980 law, this Act contained numerous detailed pro-
visions, but the most important authorized banks and
other depository institutions to offer accounts with
characteristics similar to those of MMMFs. In ac-
cordance with this legislation, banks and thrifts intro-
duced money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) in
December 1982. Subsequently, so-called Super
NOW accounts were introduced in January 1983.
Neither of these instruments is subject to a rate
ceiling. The principal difference between the two
accounts is that there are no limits on the number of
third-party payments transactions that can be made
with a Super NOW account, while there are limits
in the case of MMDA accounts. Since Super NOWs
have more of the characteristics of pure transactions
accounts than MMDAs, they are subject to the same
reserve requirements as ordinary demand deposits
and other transactions accounts. MMDAs are con-
sidered savings deposits, which are not subject to
reserve requirements. Further, Super NOWs, be-
cause of their greater transactions powers, typically
have lower yields than MMDAs.
19 Unlike MMMFs,
both MMDAs and Super NOWs are covered by
federal deposit insurance. At present, however, both
instruments require a $1,000 minimum balance.
The authorization of MMDAs and Super NOWs
has done much to restore the competitive position of
commercial banks and thrifts in depository markets.
Since most MMMFs, like MMDAs, limit the number
of third-party payments the holder of an account can
make, these two instruments are generally similar,
and it is appropriate to compare their growth since
the introduction of MMDAs. As Chart 4 shows,
MMDAs grew explosively immediately following
their introduction to a dollar level of approximately
$350 billion, well above the peak level attained by
19 MMDAs permit up to six transfers per month other
than by appearing in person, but no more than three of
these can be by check. In recent months, MMDA yields
have exceeded Super NOW yields by approximately 2
percentage points.





































DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, YEAR-END 1959-1983
(Percentage of Total
1)




41.1 0.0 0.0 54.0 4.2 0.4
39.2 0.0 0.0 55.5 4.4 0.7
37.3 0.0 0.0 56.2 4.7 1.2
34.6 0.0 0.0 57.0 5.9 2.0
32.5 0.0 0.0 57.3 6.8 2.9
31.0 0.0 0.0 57.5 7.1 3.7
29.6 0.0 0.0 57.5 7.7 4.7
28.8 0.0 0.0 54.1 11.8 4.9
27.8 0.0 0.0 50.9 15.0 6.0
27.5 0.0 0.0 47.6 17.8 6.6
27.9 0.0 0.0 46.4 21.2 3.6
26.5 0.0 0.0 41.5 24.2 7.2
24.5 0.0 0.0 40.4 26.4 8.0
23.4 0.0 0.0 38.8 28.0 8.9
22.0 0.0 0.0 35.6 29.0 12.1
20.9 0.0 0.0 34.0 28.9 14.5
19.7 0.1 0.0 35.7 31.0 11.9
18.4 0.2 0.0 37.2 32.1 9.7
17.5 0.3 0.0 36.0 32.7 10.6
16.7 0.6 0.0 31.7 34.4 12.9
16.0 1.0 0.0 25.9 38.9 13.6
15.1 1.6 0.0 22.7 41.3 14.6
12.5 4.1 0.0 18.3 43.7 15.9
11.7 5.0 2.1 17.6 41.7 16.0
10.5 5.5 16.1 13.4 34.0 14.0
MMMFs.
20 The level of MMMFs declined mark-
edly in this period, and some market professionals
predicted their eventual demise. The funds have
made a strong effort to restore their competitive
position by improving their products, however, and
as the chart shows, the funds appear to be maintain-
ing their position in 1984.
3. The Quantitative Impact of Innovation and
Deregulation on the Structure of Depository Markets
The innovations and resulting deregulation in deposi-
tory markets have had a profound impact on the
structure and cost of bank and thrift liabilities.
Table IV shows the principal instruments as percent-
ages of the total from 1959 through 1983. In 1959,
non-interest-bearing demand deposits accounted for
41.1 percent of the liabilities shown in the table.
20 The considerably stronger response to MMDAs is
believed to be due primarily to the insurance feature and
the general public’s greater familiarity with the banks and



















































































1 Details may not add to totals due to rounding.
2 Other Checkable Deposits includes negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) and automatic transfer service (ATS) accounts at depository
institutions, credit union share draft accounts and demand deposits at thrift institutions.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 11Passbook savings deposits subject to a ceiling rate
accounted for most of the remainder. By 1975, just
prior to the accelerated deregulation of the late 1970s,
the demand deposit share had declined to 19.7 per-
cent. By 1983, the share had dropped further to 10.5
percent, and the Regulation Q ceilings had been
lifted on all time deposits with the exception of pass-
book savings accounts. Of particular importance in
the current situation, the category of “other check-
able deposits” (column 3 in the table), which in-
cludes ordinary NOW accounts, Super NOWs and
other interest-bearing transactions accounts, has
been rising rapidly since 1980, while the demand
deposit category has been declining. This trend
will almost certainly continue in the years ahead.
The changes manifested in Table IV have obvious
implications for U. S. depository institutions. First,
although in the past banks and other depositories
paid implicit interest in a variety of forms on demand
deposits and other liabilities that did not yield ex-
plicit interest, there can be little doubt that deregu-
lation has raised the average cost of funds for many
of these institutions, especially in recent years. This
increase has forced the adoption of more systematic
and explicit pricing policies for loans and other ser-
vices and has probably reduced cross-subsidization
across various categories of customers. Second, the
trend toward explicit interest has increased short-run
variations in the cost of funds. This has made it
necessary for depository institutions, like other finan-
cial and nonfinancial firms, to “manage” interest
rate risk to a much greater extent than formerly, by
either shortening loan maturities, making loan rates
variable, or hedging the risk in futures markets.
4. The Present Situation: Further Increases in
Competition from Nondepository Institutions, Con-
solidation in the Supply of Financial Services, and
the Demise of Geographic Restrictions While
changes in the level and variability of the cost of
funds have had important effects on depository insti-
tutions in recent years, the increased competition
from nondepository institutions has been equally
significant. In addition to the competition from
MMMFs, there have been several mergers involving
large investment banks and insurance companies, and
some of the largest nonfinancial companies in the
nation have recently added an array of additional
financial service activities to their existing install-
ment credit operations. The purpose of these con-
solidations is the creation of financial service con-
glomerates capable of providing comprehensive finan-
cial services including banking services to business
firms and households. As an example, Sears, Roe-
buck and Company, the country’s largest retail chain,
has recently acquired a large investment bank and a
large real estate finance company and linked these
operations to its existing insurance, credit card and
other financial services. By offering these services
through its vast chain of retail stores, Sears can reach
virtually every geographic market in the United
States. Merrill Lynch, American Express, and other
large companies are rapidly building similar financial
service conglomerates.
Although it is difficult to quantify the degree of
this competition in the aggregate, some idea of the
order of magnitude is conveyed by diverse statistics.
At the end of 1981, the financial service subsidiaries
of three large manufacturing companies (General
Electric, Ford, and General Motors) held $45.8 bil-
lion of consumer installment credit compared to the
$27.7 billion held worldwide by Citicorp, the Bank
of America and Chase Manhattan. At the end of the
same year, total business lending (commercial and
industrial loans, commercial mortgage loans, and
lease financing) by 32 nonbank companies was
slightly over $100 billion, one-third of the total out-
standing at the 15 largest bank holding companies.
21
In their effort to compete still more directly with
banks and other depositories, a number of nonbank
financial service providers have acquired commercial
banks in recent years. In order to avoid being classi-
fied legally as bank holding companies and therefore
subjected to banking regulation, the acquiring com-
panies have then taken advantage of a provision in
the current bank holding company law that defines a
bank as an institution that both (1) offers demand
deposits and (2) makes commercial loans. After the
elimination of one of these two activities from the
acquired bank’s operations, the bank is no longer a
bank in the eyes of the law, and the acquiring com-
pany is not a bank holding company. These affiliates,
thus transformed, have earned the awkward designa-
tion “nonbank banks.” Since nonbank banks are not
banks, they are not subject to the remaining restric-
tions on banks, notably geographic branching restric-
tions. Therefore, there is no legal barrier to prevent a
nonbank financial service provider from establishing a
national network of nonbank banks, which enor-
mously increases the deposit base on which the com-
pany can draw. In the view of many observers, non-
bank banks constitute a rather blatant circumvention
of the Glass-Steagall Act, and they were the subject
21 See Rosenblum and Siegel (1983), Chart lB, p. 16 and
Table 10, p. 26.
12 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1985of much regulatory and legislative attention in the
United States in 1984. Both houses of Congress
passed bills that would have redefined a bank in
such a way as to include most existing nonbank
banks. For various reasons, no final bill was enacted,
but the issue is almost certain to surface again in
1985.
The trend toward consolidation in the supply of
financial services has not been restricted to nonbank
and nondepository companies. Both banks and bank
holding companies have sought to enter a variety of
nonbanking industries throughout the postwar peri-
od, and their efforts have intensified in recent years.
22
Although Congress does not appear to be prepared
to repeal the main provisions of the Glass-Steagall
Act, an omnibus bill passed by the Senate in the
summer of 1984 would have permitted bank holding
companies to underwrite municipal revenue bonds
and engage in several other previously proscribed
activities. In addition, the Federal Reserve has ap-
proved the acquisition of discount brokerage com-
panies (which trade but do not underwrite securities)
by bank holding companies, and this action has been
upheld in the federal courts.
23
Apart from their efforts to expand into nonbank-
ing activities, the larger bank holding companies are
presently strengthening their effort to dismantle, de
facto if not de jure, the remaining restrictions on
geographic expansion. As noted earlier, banks and
bank holding companies have not generally been
permitted to carry on full banking operations across
state lines. Many bank holding companies, however,
operate numerous nonbank affiliates such as con-
sumer finance companies in several states,
24 and in a
somewhat ironic twist, several bank holding com-
panies have recently announced their intention to
establish interstate chains of retail-oriented nonbank
banks known as “consumer banks.” Finally, in ac-
22 A major reason for the emergence of the bank holding
company as the dominant corporate form in U. S. bank-
ing markets has been the effort to circumvent restrictions
on bank entry into nonbanking activities. Both the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 and the Amendments to
that Act in 1970 sought to close this loophole.
23 Space does not permit a discussion of the international
activities of large U. S.-based banks. These banks are
engaged in a number of nonbank activities via overseas
affiliates that they are not permitted to enter in the
United States. They would therefore be able to establish
domestic operations in many of these activities rather
quickly if the restrictions were lifted.
24 As of 1981, for example, Citicorp, which is based in
New York, operated 422 nonbanking offices in 40 states
25 A principal objective of these regional compacts ap-
and the District of Columbia.
pears to be to restrict entry into regional and local
markets by the large money center banks.
cordance with a provision of the bank holding com-
pany law that allows bank holding companies based
in one state to operate banks in another state if the
government of the second state specifically permits
it, a number of states in particular regions are pres-
ently establishing or attempting to establish reciprocal
regional interstate banking agreements. These agree-
ments would permit bank holding companies based in
the region to operate banks in any state in the
region but would preclude entry by banks based
outside the region.
25 In the absence of specific legis-
lation halting these various developments, an acceler-
ation of the growth of interstate banking activities
appears likely in the years immediately ahead.
5. Summary The powerful innovative forces
unleashed by rising inflation and advancing tech-
nology have substantially eroded the restrictive bank
regulatory structure that emerged from the Great
Depression. This erosion has had three principal
effects. First, the structure of bank funds, the aver-
age cost of these funds, and the stability of the cost
of funds have all changed dramatically since 1960.
These changes have greatly altered the character of
banking operations in the United States. Second,
although the legal separation of banking and other
lines of commerce remains in force, the actual bound-
ary has become increasingly blurred due to the ability
of nonbank institutions to offer deposit-like products
and services and the expansion of bank holding com-
panies into nonbanking activities. Finally, geographic
restrictions on banking operations have lost much of
their force in recent years.
It is still too early to determine whether these
developments have strengthened American banking
markets or weakened them, and what the longer run
effect on the welfare of the general public will be.
Although the overall profitability of U. S. banks is
still relatively high, the current strains in the Ameri-
can banking and thrift industries are well known.
The number of insured banks closed due to financial
difficulties in 1983 (48) was the highest in any year
since the 1930s. The extent to which these strains
are the result of innovation and deregulation is not
clear, nor is it clear how these difficulties will affect
innovation and deregulation in the future. The final
section of this article will speculate briefly on the
prospects.
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The innovations in banking markets just described
have been particularly visible to the average Ameri-
can citizen, and they have far-reaching implications.
The same forces driving innovation in banking, how-
ever, have also produced important innovations in
other financial markets. Developments in the securi-
ties markets and in mortgage markets have been
especially dramatic, in the form of both new instru-
ments and markets and changes in the character of
existing instruments and markets. The common
theme in nearly all of these innovations has been the
effort to reduce the risk occasioned by the heightened
volatility of interest rates. It would be difficult to
list all of these developments, but some of the more
important are the following.
1. Bond markets A sizable proportion of cor-
porate bonds issued in domestic U. S. markets cur-
rently are floating-rate bonds, and the remaining
fixed-rate issues frequently have early call or put
provisions. Further, the volume of zero-coupon
bonds, which pay their return in the form of price
appreciation rather than coupon interest payments
and therefore present no reinvestment risk, has
grown significantly since 1980.
2. Mortgage markets A majority of the resi-
dential mortgages issued in the United States at
present are adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS),
which permit the lender to vary the interest rate
during the term of the loan, usually on specified dates
and subject to specified restrictions. Also, a large
and active market for securities backed by pools of
mortgages has developed, which has increased the
volume of mortgage lending by insurance companies
and pension funds and thus insulated the market to
some extent from the difficulties currently plaguing
the thrift industry as a result of the secular rise in
interest rates. On balance, these innovations appear
to have benefited both the residential construction
industry and home buyers, since the recovery of the
homebuilding sector of the economy following the
1981-1982 recession was strong. There is presently
considerable concern, however, that the existence of a
large stock of variable rate mortgage debt will in-
crease the incidence of default if and when interest
rates come under renewed upward pressure.
3. Futures markets Trading in interest rate fu-
tures in the United States has grown rapidly since the
first market opened in 1975. There are currently
markets for six instruments: mortgage-backed secur-
ities guaranteed by the Government National Mort-
gage Association (GNMA), U. S. Treasury bonds,
U. S. Treasury bills, domestic bank CDs, Euro-
dollars, and U. S. Treasury notes. The existence of
these markets and their increasing depth make it
possible for both institutions and individuals to hedge
their exposure to interest rate movements consider-
ably more cheaply than is possible in cash markets.
26
Because it is possible, however, for market partici-
pants motivated by a desire to speculate rather than a
desire to hedge to engage in futures transactions with
relatively small cash outlays, it is not yet clear
whether the existence of futures markets has reduced
or increased the overall level of risk in financial
markets.
This section has focused on the impact of recent
financial innovation on the structure and behavior of
markets. The next section examines the implications
for monetary policy.
IV.
THE EFFECT OF INNOVATION ON U. S.
MONETARY POLICY
In addition to their impact on markets, innovation
and deregulation have led to an intensive and exten-
sive reexamination of the conduct of monetary policy
in the United States, and this reexamination in turn
has clearly affected the substance of policy actions in
some recent years. This section will briefly describe
the present strategy of U. S. monetary policy and
then indicate some of the principal questions and
operational problems that innovation and deregula-
tion have raised regarding this strategy.
A. The Current Strategy of U. S.
Monetary Policy
The evolution of U. S. monetary policy in the
postwar period has been a long and rather diffuse
process. Although there has always been some atten-
tion to monetary conditions-as opposed to credit
conditions-and the behavior of monetary aggregates,
it is probably accurate to say that most of the empha-
sis in the actual conduct of policy in the 1950s and
1960s was on the effect of the Federal Reserve’s
policy actions on the availability and cost of credit in
short-term credit markets.
Since about 1970, however, increased attention
has been given to monetary conditions and specifically
26 The recent development of options markets for several
financial futures contracts has significantly broadened the
range of hedging strategies available to investors.
14 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1985to the growth rates of various measures of the money
supply. This increased focus on money, which has
also developed in several other industrial countries
in the same period, has resulted partly from the rise
of “monetarism” to prominence in the academic liter-
ature on monetary policy in the late 1960s and early
1970s and partly from dissatisfaction with the per-
ceived failure of credit- and interest-rate oriented
policies to deal effectively with the secular rise in
inflation.
As a result of these developments, the present
stated strategy of Federal Reserve policy centers
around control of the monetary aggregates.
27 At the
beginning of each year, the Fed establishes a target
range for the growth rate of each monetary aggregate
from the fourth quarter of the preceding year to the
fourth quarter of the current year. It then monitors
the actual growth of the aggregates in relation to the
targets and acts to correct deviations from the
targets unless it feels that unanticipated economic
or financial developments warrant the deviation. The
ultimate objective of this strategy is to contribute to
the stabilization of both economic conditions in gen-
eral and the behavior of prices in particular. For
this reason, the strategy is often referred to as one of
using monetary aggregates as “intermediate” targets
of policy.
It is obvious that the successful implementation of
this strategy requires a stable and predictable rela-
tionship between the monetary aggregates targeted
and the ultimate objectives of monetary policy such
as the rate of growth of nominal GNP and the be-
havior of the price level. It is widely asserted that
recent financial innovation and deregulation have
weakened this relationship in the United States and
made it less predictable. Further, some monetary
economists believe that innovation and deregulation
have reduced the ability of the Fed to control the
growth of the aggregates effectively. The remainder
of this section summarizes the evidence supporting
these contentions.
B. Evidence of Instability in the Relationship
Between the Monetary Aggregates and
Nominal GNP in the United States
1. Possible downward shifts in money demand,
1975 and 1980-1981 The problems encountered in
27 The Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 requires the
Federal Reserve to report its objectives for the growth
of the monetary and credit aggregates each year. The
current formal definitions of the monetary aggregates
are published each month in the notes to statistical table
1.21 in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
the conduct of U. S. monetary policy have stimulated
considerable new research over the last decade on
the relationship between money and GNP. Much
of this research has taken the form of empirical esti-
mation and re-estimation of conventional Goldfeld-
type money demand equations or variations of these
equations using the Ml aggregate, coupled with tests
of the ability of the equations to predict the longer
run growth of the monetary aggregates in the out-of-
sample period.
28 Table V reproduces a table from a
recent article by Porter and Offenbacher
29 that pre-
sents empirical evidence typical of that produced by
much of this research. The table shows both the
annual and cumulative errors in the predicted growth
of M1
30 from a standard money demand equation
over the 1967-1974 and 1974-1981 periods, respec-
tively. The annual growth rate errors suggest that
there may have been downward shifts in the demand
for money in relation to income in 1975 and again in
1980 and 1981. Economists who believe that such
shifts in fact occurred generally attribute them to
financial innovation and deregulation. Improved cash
management techniques in the corporate sector are
thought to be mainly responsible for the shift in 1975.
More careful management in the household sector-
made possible by the introduction of MMMFs-is
thought to have contributed significantly to the shift
in 1980 and 1981.
31
28 Following Goldfeld (1973), these money demand func-
tions have the following general form:
where M
D = money demand
P = price level
rl = a nominal short-term market interest rate
r2 = a nominal short-term regulated interest
rate
y = real income.
For a review of much of this research, see Judd and
Scadding (1982B).
29 See Richard D. Porter and Edward K. Offenbacher,
“Financial Innovations and Measurement of Monetary
Aggregates,” in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(1984), Table 3-1, pp. 53-54.
30 The M1 series used in constructing the table was
adjusted to eliminate the effects of institutional changes
on this aggregate. See footnote 2 of the Porter-
Offenbacher article.
31 For specific evidence on the impact of MMMFs see
Dotsey, Englander and Partlan (1981-82). It should be
noted-that although the view that a downward shift in
money demand occurred in the mid-1970s is widely held,
there is much less agreement regarding the possible shift
in 1980-1981. For an argument that no shift occurred in
the latter period, see Pierce (1982).
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OUT-OF-SAMPLE ERRORS
1 FROM A GOLDFELD M1 EQUATION




















































































































































1967:1 to 1974:2 1974:3 to 1981:4
Annualized Annualized
Quarterly Annual Quarterly Annual
Growth Rates Growth Rates Growth Rates Growth Rates
Mean Error .4 .2 2.6 2.6
Root Mean
Square Error 2.1 1.1 4.7 3.3
1 Error is predicted value minus actual value.
Source: Porter, Richard D. and Edward K. Offenbacher, “Financial Innovation and
Measurement of Monetary Aggregates,” in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(1984), Table 3-1, pp. 53-4.
2. The unusual behavior of M1 velocity, 1982-
1983 A further instance of apparent instability in
the relationship between M1 and nominal GNP oc-
curred during the recession in 1982 and the recovery
from that recession in 1983. In contrast to the
possible downward shifts in money demand in 1975
and 1980-1981, M1 grew unusually rapidly in rela-
tion to nominal GNP in the 1982-1983 period. This
can be depicted by charting the growth of M1 ve-
locity, i.e., the ratio of nominal GNP to M1, as in
Chart 5. As the chart makes clear, while velocity
typically declines or grows more slowly in recessions
than in other stages of the business cycle, the decline
was much sharper in the 1981-1982 recession than in
any other cycle since the 1950s. Research done by
the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve suggests that the introduction of interest-
bearing NOW accounts (which are included in Ml
as it is presently defined) has increased the interest
elasticity of Ml demand in a manner that could not
have been easily predicted in advance.
32 An impli-
cation of this view is that further deregulation may
also change the parameters of the M1 money demand
function in ways that cannot be anticipated. Research
done at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
however, indicates that the unusual behavior of ve-
locity in 1982 and 1983 can be explained by (1) the
decline in inflation in 1982 and (2) the precipitous
drop in interest rates in the third quarter of 1982 in
the context of a stable money demand function.
33
C. Effect of the Evidence of Instability on
the Recent Conduct of Monetary Policy
and Policy Research
As one might expect, the evidence of possible in-
stability in the money-GNP relationship has raised
doubts regarding the feasibility of continuing to use
intermediate money supply targets as a central ele-
ment in the strategy of U. S. policy. In this regard,
it should be noted that much of this evidence pertains
to M1. M1, which is the narrowest of the aggregates,
is intended to be a measure of transactions balances,
and it has generally received more attention than the
broader monetary aggregates from the general public.
One of the results of the events in 1982 and 1983 just
described was a temporary change in the operational
emphasis of policy away from Ml in the direction of
the broader measures. In particular, the Fed an-
nounced in late 1982 that it was deemphasizing Ml
and giving greater weight to M2 and M3 in its oper-
ations. Further, in 1983 the Fed established a range
for the growth of a broad measure of total credit for
the first time, partly in response to arguments that
M1 had lost its meaning.
34 The emergence of a more
normal pattern in the behavior of M1 velocity in the
32 See Brayton, Farr and Porter (1983).
33 See Judd (1983). See also Broaddus and Goodfriend
(1984), pp, 11-14.
34 The case for focusing on credit rather than monetary
aggregates has been advanced especially strongly by
Frank E. Morris, the president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston. See Morris (1982).
16 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1985latter part of 1983 and the first half of 1984, however,
led to the restoration of Ml to target status in July
1984.
As noted in the discussion of prospects for mone-
tary policy in the next section of this article, the Fed
has come under pressure from several quarters re-
cently to drop its money supply targets in favor of
one of several alternative strategies. To date, the
Fed itself has given no indication that it is planning
to take such a step. Indeed, much of the research
done by the staff of the Board of Governors of the
Fed in recent years has been aimed at improving the
technical foundation for the continued use of a mone-
tary aggregates strategy.
This research has taken two separate directions.
First, an effort has been made to improve the specifi-
cation of money demand equations in order to im-
prove their performance. An example of this research
is the Simpson-Porter model of money demand,
which includes a so-called “ratchet” variable designed
to capture the impact of cash management innovations
induced by the successively higher interest rate peaks
in the 1970s and early 1980s.
35 Although inclusion of
this variable does not eliminate the overprediction of
money demand shown in Table V, it reduces it
significantly.
The second area of research has focused on the
construction of alternative monetary aggregates
known as Divisia aggregates using the theory of index
numbers.
36 Conventional monetary aggregates such
35 See Simpson and Porter (1980). For a more recent
example of further research on the money demand func-
tion see Brayton, Farr and Porter (1983).
36 See Barnett and Spindt (1982).
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 17as M1 are simple summations of their various com-
ponents with no attention given in the aggregation
process to differences in the monetary services pro-
vided by the components. For example, M1 as it is
currently defined includes (1) currency and demand
deposits, which pay no explicit interest but provide a
wide range of transactions services, and (2) several
interest-bearing accounts such as conventional NOW
accounts and Super NOW accounts, which are also
partly transactions instruments, but which provide
some savings services-i.e., store of value services-
as well. Divisia aggregation takes account of these
differences by assigning different weights to the com-
ponents of an aggregate in constructing the aggre-
gate. To be specific, the weight attached to each
component is determined by the spread between the
market yield paid on a nonmonetary asset such as
commercial paper and the explicit own yield paid on
the component in question. This spread is the oppor-
tunity cost of holding the component (in terms of
explicit interest foregone) and is assumed to be a
reasonable proxy for the rental cost of the monetary
services provided by the component and therefore for
the flow of services themselves. In this way, the
highest weights are assigned to assets like currency
that have the highest spreads and therefore presum-
ably yield the greatest flow of monetary services.
Although Divisia aggregation would appear to be
superior in principle to conventional simple-sum
aggregation, empirical results using these aggregates
have been mixed. In recent dynamic simulations
using two money demand specifications,
37 the Divisia
aggregates generally outperformed their conventional
counterparts in the case of the broader aggregates,
but they yielded inferior results in the case of the
narrower aggregates such as Ml. For this reason,
and in view of the obvious difficulties the Fed would
encounter in communicating its objectives to the
public if it were to substitute the Divisia aggregates
for the standard aggregates in setting its monetary
targets, it is unlikely that the Divisia measures will
play a major operational role in the actual imple-
mentation of policy in the foreseeable future. Con-
tinued research with these measures, however, and
informal monitoring of their behavior may help the
Fed avoid being misled by temporarily aberrant be-
havior of the conventional aggregates due to innova-
tion and deregulation.




To this point this article has dealt with the past
and the present. This section will look to the future
and speculate on how the lingering effects of the
innovation that has already occurred and the effects
of further innovation may influence the structure and
functioning of financial markets and the conduct of
monetary policy in the years ahead. Long and some-
times unhappy experience has taught the author that
forecasting is the most dangerous of all the profes-
sional activities economists engage in. Accordingly,
the speculative comments that follow will focus pri-
marily on the relatively near-term future through the
remainder of the 1980s.
A. Prospects for the Financial Markets and
the Provision of Financial Services
As noted above, American financial institutions-
especially commercial banks and thrift institutions-
have come under severe pressure in recent years due
to rising competition from external sources, the im-
pact of deregulation on the cost of funding, the appar-
ent deterioration in the quality of some bank loan
portfolios, and the increased incidence of bank fail-
ures. As a result of these developments and the
concern they have stimulated both in the political
arena and among regulatory agencies, the pace of
deregulation slowed in 1984, and it may well remain
lower in the near-term future.
The forces driving the longer run process of inno-
vation and deregulation, however, are still very much
alive, and the process is therefore likely to continue
in the absence of a major financial catastrophe.
Several developments seem probable in the years
immediately ahead. First, one of the measures avail-
able to deal with the current weakness of some thrift
institutions and the associated risk is a more lenient
stance by the regulators toward acquisitions of thrifts
by bank holding companies. Such consolidations
would further blur the distinctions between various
categories of depository institutions. Second, the
breakdown of the barriers to interstate banking is
almost certain to continue. At the moment, it appears
that the next stage of this process will take the form
of regional agreements that exclude the money center
banks, but the latter can be expected to press hard
38 It should be emphasized that the somewhat speculative
views presented in this section are the author’s and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
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ble they will receive judicial relief under the anti-
trust laws. Finally, the line of separation between
(1) banking and (2) other financial and nonfinancial
activities is likely to be eroded further as banks and
nonbank institutions both seek to expand further
into the other group’s territory. In particular, there
is a fairly high probability that legislation will be
passed in the relatively near future allowing banks to
underwrite municipal revenue bonds and perhaps
securities backed by mortgage pools, since the po-
tential for abuse seems minimal in these areas.
The examples just given relate to near-term pros-
pects and are relatively narrow in scope. The larger
and more important issue is: What will the structure
of U. S. banking and financial markets look like in
1990? Will there be significant further erosion of
product-line barriers so that banks and other com-
panies meld into “department stores” of finance?
Will small banks and other small financial institutions
be swallowed up by larger institutions ? It is impos-
sible to do more than guess at the answers to these
questions. Some further consolidation across product
lines may occur. But many of the conflicts of interest
and other risks that the Glass-Steagall Act attempted
to prevent are still perceived to be real dangers, so
it is unlikely that the basic legal barrier between
banking and commerce will be dismantled in the
foreseeable future. Perhaps more fundamentally, the
microeconomics of such consolidations is not well
understood at present. Specifically, the extent of
joint economies in the production and consumption of
diverse financial services is not known. In these
circumstances, it seems likely that a substantial de-
gree of specialization in the provision of financial
services will persist even if a further dismantling of
the regulatory barriers occurs. In a similar way,
since there is no clear evidence of significant econo-
mies of scale in banking, the specter of large bank
holding companies absorbing most small, community-
oriented banks seems far-fetched, although there will
probably be some reduction in the number of inde-
pendent banking organizations operating in the
country.
Two final comments should be made regarding the
prospects for change in (1) the structure of the fi-
nancial regulatory agencies and (2) the system of
federal deposit insurance. Suggestions have been
made for many years for changes that would simplify
the currently cumbersome structure of U. S. finan-
cial regulatory agencies, which involves a mixture of
federal and state agencies and the existence of several
agencies with somewhat overlapping responsibilities
at the federal level. The most recent formal recom-
mendations were announced in early 1984 by the
Task Group on Regulation of Financial Institutions
chaired by Vice President Bush.
39 Among other
things, these recommendations called for simplifying
the structure at the federal level by assigning the
responsibility for regulating and supervising all but
the largest banking organizations to a new agency
built around the present Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency. Responsibility for the largest or-
ganizations would be vested in the Federal Reserve.
If past experience is any guide, resistance by the
affected agencies and their constituencies will pre-
vent the early adoption of these recommendations.
Regarding the deposit insurance system, the failure
of the Continental Illinois Bank and the events lead-
ing up to that failure have brought earlier recom-
mendations for reform of the system to the attention
of both the Congress and the public.
40 Many of these
recommendations are for changes that would reduce
the danger that the existence of deposit insurance
might tempt banks to take risks they would otherwise
avoid. Examples of the suggested changes are reduc-
tions in the coverage of time deposits, permitting
private insurance companies to compete with govern-
ment agencies in providing insurance, and permitting
graduated premiums that reflect the relative risk of
failure of individual institutions. Despite their logical
appeal, these recommendations raise a number of
questions. What criteria, for example, would be
used to determine relative risk in administering grad-
uated premiums? These kinds of questions plus the
broad public support for the present insurance system
make it unlikely that wholesale changes will be forth-
coming at an early date unless further disruptions in
banking markets force them.
B. Prospects Regarding Monetary Policy
As pointed out in Section IV of this paper, the
evidence of a reduction in the stability of the empirical
relationship between the U. S. money supply and
nominal GNP has caused some observers to question
whether the Federal Reserve should continue to
follow a strategy of using monetary aggregates as
intermediate policy targets. The conventional theory
of short-run economic stabilization
41 implies that if
the monetary sector of the economy is less stable and
39 See Office of the Press Secretary to the Vice President
of the United States (1984).
40 See, for example, Benston (1983A).
41 See Poole (1970).
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ventional Hicksian model, the position of the LM
curve is less stable and predictable than the position
of the IS curve-targeting interest rates will yield a
better policy performance than targeting the money
supply. Against this background, some economists
have concluded that innovation has in fact reduced
the predictability of the money-GNP relationship to
such an extent that targeting money supply growth is
no longer appropriate, at least as long as significant
innovation and deregulation are occurring. Several
alternative targets have been suggested including
nominal GNP and real interest rates.
Others, however, favor retention of the present
strategy at least for the present. They point out that
the instability that has been observed in recent years
has resulted from (1) concerted efforts in the 1970s
to circumvent regulations in the face of high inflation
and high interest rates and (2) the disruptions caused
by subsequent deregulation. With the deregulation
process now well advanced, future innovation may be
more gradual and more predictable. Further, while
innovation and deregulation may have temporarily
affected the relationship between the conventional
measures of money such as Ml and the economy,
they have not necessarily destabilized the monetary
sector in any fundamental way. Therefore, targeting
the monetary base or some other measure of high-
powered money might still be feasible even if empiri-
cal problems with other monetary aggregates per-
sisted.
A related issue that has received attention recently
concerns the feasibility of monetary control if re-
maining interest rate ceilings are removed. A control
procedure the Fed has used frequently in the past
involves the direct or indirect manipulation of short-
term interest rates in order to affect the opportunity
cost of holding money balances and therefore the
demand for money. It is sometimes argued that with
interest rate ceilings removed, yields on the com-
ponents of the money supply will vary with market
interest rates, thereby reducing the elasticity of
money demand with respect to interest rates and
increasing the change in interest rates required to
produce any desired change in the growth of money.
Even in a completely deregulated environment, how-
ever, explicit yields on assets providing significant
monetary services are likely to vary less than market
yields. Therefore, the interest elasticity of money
demand--especially the demand for Ml, which in-
cludes currency and other transactions instruments-
may remain sufficiently high for the purposes of
monetary control.
This rather technical discussion regarding inter-
mediate targets and monetary control is important,
but it is only a relatively narrow aspect of the broader
public debate about monetary policy that is currently
going on in the United States. The experience in
recent years of historically high peace-time inflation,
high and extremely volatile interest rates, two severe
and protracted recessions, and wide swings in the
value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets has
produced demands from some quarters for far-
reaching changes in the strategy of monetary policy
and in the responsibilities and authority of the Fed-
eral Reserve. In particular, a small but vocal group
is pressing for a return to the gold standard or some
alternative commodity standard.
Although another sharp rise in interest rates or
inflation or another recession might motivate the
Congress to require fundamental changes in the con-
duct of monetary policy, the more likely outcome over
the remainder of the 1980s is continuation of the
present monetary aggregates strategy coupled with
an effort to change the institutional regime in which
the strategy is pursued in ways that will make it
more likely to succeed. Some of these changes are
already in place. The Monetary Control Act of 1980
extended Federal Reserve reserve requirements to all
depository institutions,
42 which reduces variations in
the aggregate required reserve ratio due to shifts
of deposits across classes of institutions. Further, a
change in the reserve accounting mechanism in
early 1984 from a lagged system to a (nearly)
contemporaneous system has made it feasible for the
Fed to change its procedure for controlling the mone-
tary aggregates from one that operates through
changes in short-term interest rates to one that oper-
ates through the supply of total reserves.
43 It should
be emphasized, however, that although the current
strategy of U. S. policy is formally one of controlling
monetary aggregates, there is considerable room
within this strategy for discretionary changes in the
emphasis actually given to monetary control-
especially short-run monetary control-as against
other objectives such as stabilizing interest rates in
particular time periods. Because it regards such
flexibility as desirable, the Fed is likely to resist
committing itself to a monetary control regime that
42 The requirements had previously been applied only to
the minority of commercial banks that were members of
the Federal Reserve System.
43 Many monetary economists believe that control via a
reserve instrument is more efficient than control through
interest rates, even though there is relatively little his-
torical experience on which to base a test of the propo-
sition.
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actions in the short run.
C. Concluding Comment
This paper has presented an overview of recent
financial innovation in the United States, the deregu-
lation it has helped to force, and some of the major
effects of this process on financial institutions and
markets and on monetary policy. As the discussion
has indicated, these developments are extremely di-
verse when they are considered individually. None-
theless, there are certain unifying themes. In broad-
est terms, the last ten years have witnessed the
collapse of an important part of the regulatory re-
gime erected in the 1930s and the erosion of at least
part of the philosophy of banking and financial regu-
lation that sustained it. The forces that produced
this change had been building since at least the 1950s,
but they attained a certain critical mass in the 1970s
that accelerated the process of change. It is of course
possible that the process will continue at this same
accelerated pace in the years immediately ahead. But
it is also possible-and perhaps more likely-that
the remainder of this decade will be a welcome period
of consolidation characterized by a slower rate of
innovation and change.
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